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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that solutions to normative challenges associated with auton-
omous driving, such as real-world trolley cases or distributions of risk in mundane 
driving situations, face the problem of reasonable pluralism: Reasonable pluralism 
refers to the fact that there exists a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible com-
prehensive moral doctrines (religions, philosophies, worldviews) within liberal 
democracies. The corresponding problem is that a politically acceptable solution 
cannot refer to only one of these comprehensive doctrines. Yet a politically adequate 
solution to the normative challenges of autonomous driving need not come at the 
expense of an ethical solution, if it is based on moral beliefs that are (1) shared in an 
overlapping consensus and (2) systematized through public reason. Therefore, we 
argue that a Rawlsian justificatory framework is able to adequately address the nor-
mative challenges of autonomous driving and elaborate on how such a framework 
might be employed for this purpose.
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1 Introduction
Autonomous driving (AD) is an emerging technology that enables all of the dynamic 
driving tasks involved in operating a vehicle to be managed by its network- and sen-
sor-supported computer system so that no human passenger is required to monitor 
the traffic.1 This technology, if it (ever) comes to full fruition, promises immense 
advantages over our present transportation systems in which vehicles are still 
(mostly) operated by human drivers — advantages such as increased road safety, 
comfort, and access to personal mobility for previously excluded groups (e.g., the 
elderly, children, or people with impairments). However, AD also poses serious nor-
mative problems that must be solved if the technology progresses and is actually to 
be implemented as a mobility option in liberal democracies. Accordingly, there is an 
evolving philosophical and public debate on these issues.
While there are a number of serious fundamental normative challenges facing 
AD (AD challenges), we will take as an important example the specific challenge 
of determining the criteria that should govern an autonomous vehicle’s decision-
making process, especially when facing the threat of crashes or other accident sce-
narios. This problem can be exemplified by so-called trolley cases2: how should an 
autonomous vehicle (AV) react if it is faced with an accident scenario in which it is 
only possible to prevent serious harm to one group of persons by seriously harming 
another group of persons? We will also consider the related challenge of defining the 
acceptable risk of harm to fellow road users caused by an AV under normal traffic 
conditions.3 In the current debate, these two challenges are given a wide variety of 
solutions, which are often grounded within specific comprehensive moral doctrines 
(Leben, 2017; Bonnefon et al., 2016; Wallach & Allen, 2008).4
In Sect.  2, our paper introduces an important aspect of dealing with AD chal-
lenges that — in our view — has not yet been adequately discussed in the debate: 
the problem of reasonable pluralism. This problem was identified by the political 
2 This refers to an ethical debate on the classic trolley problems: thought experiments introduced by Foot 
(1967) and Thomson (1976).
3 For further detailed discussion of AD challenges, see Sect. 4.
4 On the general ethical debate about accidents involving AV, see Hevelke and Nida-Rümelin (2015) and 
N. J. Goodall (2014a); (2014b).
1 An alternative term for AD used in science and industry is “automated (and connected) driving.” This 
term better captures the central notion of the emerging technology since the concept of autonomy in 
ethical and legal thought involves some features that are not and perhaps cannot be implemented in AD, 
such as (personal) agency or (moral) responsibility. Nevertheless, the terms “AD” and “autonomous 
vehicle” are often used, especially in the normative debates we will be focusing on. For this reason, we 
will use these terms to refer to vehicles with a high degree of automation (i.e. in terms of the automa-
tion levels defined in the SAE International Standard J3016: a vehicle with automation of level 4 [high 
driving automation] or level 5 [full driving automation] (SAE International 2018)). Since these levels 
of automation have not yet been achieved, our findings will primarily pertain to a yet still hypothetical 
future. When or if a level 5 type of driving automation will be fully developed in the future remains an 
open question for us. However, we are confident that level 4 automation — AD under specific conditions 
and in specific zones — can be established in the foreseeable future. While our findings might be par-
tially applicable to normative challenges of existing levels of automation (levels 2 and 3), this will not be 
addressed in the present article.
1 3
Autonomous Driving and Public Reason: a Rawlsian Approach 
philosophy of John Rawls and is based on the fact that there exists a plurality of 
reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive moral doctrines (e.g., religions, philoso-
phies, worldviews) within liberal democracies. The problem that arises due to rea-
sonable pluralism is that acceptable answers to fundamental political questions can-
not refer to only one of these comprehensive moral doctrines, since these answers 
must in principle be acceptable to every reasonable citizen. We argue that solutions 
to AD challenges are ultimately faced with the problem of reasonable pluralism. As 
stated above, there are several potential solutions to AD challenges, and especially 
those that pertain to the criteria for the automated decision-making process are usu-
ally grounded in specific comprehensive moral doctrines. At the same time, deci-
sions about AD challenges are political in nature, which means that any politically 
legitimate solutions to these challenges cannot be based solely on any one reason-
able comprehensive moral doctrine. Fortunately, the problem of reasonable plural-
ism has a well-known solution: solutions to AD challenges are acceptable when they 
are justified within the framework of public reason and respect the corresponding 
requirements. Interestingly, this applies not just to AD challenges but to all funda-
mental normative challenges posed by emerging technologies — thus our findings 
are significant for any kind of technology assessment or ethics of technology.
In Sect. 3, we outline a Rawlsian framework for public reason in which solutions 
to AD challenges must be justified by the method of full reflective equilibrium. This 
means (among other things) that all arguments that are crucial for the justification 
of a specific solution to AD challenges must have premises that are either shared by 
all reasonable citizens in a so-called overlapping consensus or supported by shared 
commitments.
A more detailed characterization of two important AD challenges is given in 
Sect. 4 in order to provide a more concrete background for our further discussion. 
We will focus on the relationship between trolley cases and real-world collision situ-
ations as well as on normative challenges of so-called mundane driving situations. 
The trolley problem and by extension the design of a multitude of different trol-
ley cases — with the MIT moral machine experiment (Awad et al., 2018) provid-
ing abundant examples — has been a popular topic of research and discussion in 
the debate on AD for some time. We will address the rather controversial question 
whether the advent of AD will lead to “real-world trolley cases.” Some scholars 
believe that AVs will be faced with dilemmatic decisions that are sufficiently similar 
to trolley cases (Lin, 2016; Wallach & Allen, 2008; Bonnefon et al., 2016), while 
critical voices are more skeptical about such situations arising and claim that other, 
more dire ethical challenges should take precedence (Himmelreich, 2018; Nyholm 
& Smids, 2016; N. Goodall, 2019; JafariNaimi, 2018). We will take a closer look at 
the contribution of the discussion of trolley cases and mundane driving situations to 
the establishment of an overlapping consensus regarding AD.
As the overlapping consensus in different societies might be developed to varying 
degrees, we distinguish in Sect. 5 two forms of overlapping consensus: (1) a sub-
stantial overlapping consensus and (2) a less substantial or insubstantial overlapping 
consensus. The solutions that can be given for AD challenges and their correspond-
ing justified political decisions might depend on the form of overlapping consensus 
a given society has developed.
 C. Brändle, M. W. Schmidt 
1 3
In Sect. 6, we discuss the need for a debate on the meta-level: there must be a 
discussion of whether it is in fact desirable to authorize the implementation of AD. 
This meta-challenge might depend partly on whether it is possible to find justified 
solutions for the AD challenges presented in Sect. 4.
We summarize and conclude in Sect. 7.
2  How to Justify Regulation for AD? A Middle Ground Between 
Political Realism and Political Moralism
The political sphere is obviously important for AD challenges: solutions to AD chal-
lenges (as well as to many fundamental normative challenges related to other emerg-
ing technologies) will have to take the form of feasible political regulation (which 
also informs further research and engineering). Why? The main reason is that the 
use of an actual AV imposes on persons certain serious risks. The use of an AV 
could lead to accidents, potentially harming the passengers and fellow road users 
and thereby impacting their right to bodily integrity or even their right to life. Since 
these rights are important political values that must be protected in a liberal democ-
racy, such a democracy has to regulate technologies (and their use) that pose such 
risks. Thus, political regulation for AD will be necessary in any liberal democracy.
Now, not just any political regulation will suffice. Political regulation of AD can 
impose constraints on individuals’ decisions and choices and on the development of 
the technology — on research, innovation, engineering and entrepreneurship, and 
many other areas of life that are also connected with certain rights and liberties. 
Especially when political regulation is concerned with fundamental rights, it must 
be legitimate. And in order to be legitimate, political regulation of AD — a solution 
to AD challenges — must be justified in a politically adequate way.
What does it mean for a political regulation such as a solution to AD challenges 
to be justified in a politically adequate way? Let us examine two exemplary positions 
on how proposed solutions to AD challenges are to be justified. These positions 
seem to contradict one another but each also has a valid point. We will then propose 
a middle ground that adopts the plausible aspects of both positions.
The first position is formulated by Himmelreich (2018), who points out that we 
should not try to justify such solutions by means of a comprehensive moral doctrine 
and by doing moral philosophy:
[…] we think that this locates the problem on the wrong level. Instead, solu-
tions are called for on the level of politics. Whereas moral philosophy is a 
reflection on individual conduct, political philosophy is a reflection on social 
arrangements before the backdrop of substantive disagreement. (Himmelreich, 
2018, 676).
So, AD challenges according to Himmelreich are to be solved primarily through 
collective reflection and political regulation and not through personal moral reflec-
tion and personal decisions. In this case, collective reflection must indeed deal with 
the fact of reasonable pluralism, which Rawls describes in Political Liberalism and 
associated works:
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A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of 
incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is 
affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future 
one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or 
nearly all citizens. Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plural-
ity of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of 
the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a con-
stitutional democratic regime. (Rawls, 2005, xvi).
Indeed, Himmelreich refers to Rawls’s political liberalism as an alternative jus-
tificatory framework to a moral philosophy based only on specific comprehensive 
moral doctrines. However, there is also a notable difference between Rawls’s posi-
tion and Himmelreich’s proposal. Rawls makes a distinction between a political jus-
tification that would adequately address a reasonable pluralism but is still based on 
the moral powers of the citizens (especially their sense of justice), and a metaphysi-
cal justification that would be inadequate (Rawls, 1985). Considered judgements 
concerning justice as elements of a political justification thus remain moral judge-
ments to some degree. Rawls himself states that his political conception of justice 
“[…] is, of course, a moral conception […]” (Rawls, 1985, 389; see also Rawls, 
2005, 11; Rawls, 2001, 26). In contrast, Himmelreich makes a distinction between 
politically and morally justified solutions to AD challenges. He stresses that the nec-
essary political solutions to AD challenges would not be moral solutions:
[…] what we in fact face is a social choice. What seems needed is a kind of com-
promise to overcome disagreements over issues of value. Insofar as we value the 
moral diversity of our political community, it should be recognized that autonomous 
vehicles pose primarily a political problem, not a moral one. (Himmelreich, 2018, 
676).
Now, Himmelreich’s position is somewhat ambiguous: What does it mean that 
AD challenges and their solutions are primarily political and not moral? Is it simply 
a matter of finding a solution that is actually accepted through democratic decision-
making, or are there still moral constraints on which solution might be acceptable? 
It is possible to read Himmelreich as if the only concern is the political acceptance 
of AD-solutions and not their acceptability.5
Adopting this interpretation of Himmelreich, Keeling (2020) criticizes this posi-
tion and advocates for an alternative, which is the second position we want to pre-
sent. Keeling acknowledges that social acceptance is a necessary condition for an 
adequately justified solution to AD challenges, but rejects Himmelreich’s framing of 
AD challenges as merely a problem of social choice. If a solution is political simply 
by virtue of having an empirical social acceptance and providing stability, then this 
5 Taebi (2017) raises the issue of a discrepancy between political or social acceptance on the one hand 
and moral or ethical acceptability on the other in the context of nuclear waste storage. Similar to our 
approach, the author applies the Rawlsian concept of the reflective equilibrium to this problem, albeit in 
the form of wide instead of a full reflective equilibrium (Taebi 2017). On the difference between wide 
and full reflective equilibrium, see Sect. 3 of the present paper.
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is not a desirable solution, since the aim is to find a solution that is morally correct 
or acceptable. Keeling argues that no solutions to AD challenges that are immoral 
or ignore morally relevant arguments or morally justified distinctions would be 
adequate:
[T]here are reasons to accept or reject solutions to the moral design problem [of 
AD] which do not pertain to social choice. On one hand, if a collective judgement 
holds that AVs should act in accordance with immoral principles, then there is a 
moral reason to reject that solution to the moral design problem. On the other hand, 
if there is a moral difference between, for example, killing and letting die, then there 
is a pro tanto reason for this distinction to be reflected in AV decision-making algo-
rithms. (Keeling, 2020, 304).
The arguments Keeling presents have some plausibility but raise different prob-
lems. What criteria should determine that a solution to AD challenges is immoral? 
What criteria should define a valid and relevant moral argument or distinction? It is 
plausible to interpret Keeling as if these moral aspects are determined without con-
sidering the political sphere at all by means of a comprehensive moral doctrine such 
as a form of utilitarianism or Kantianism, which would be problematic in the light of 
reasonable pluralism.
This is where the main thesis of our paper comes into play. We argue that both 
Keeling and Himmelreich make important points and that it is possible to combine 
the two positions while avoiding the more problematic aspects highlighted in the 
interpretations above. A middle ground between Himmelreich and Keeling would 
be to accept the need for moral justifications of solutions to AD challenges while 
acknowledging that these solutions must be political as well in a certain sense: the 
moral justification and the reasonable acceptance of this justification in the politi-
cal sphere should not be seen as two distinct processes. It is not the case that one 
first justifies a solution to AD challenges morally and then, in a separate second 
step, shows that this justification is in fact accepted by all or the majority of rea-
sonable citizens (or vice versa). This would not ensure that the solution is accepted 
for the right reasons (Rawls, 1997, 781). Rather, the political justification begins 
with shared moral (and non-moral) commitments — commitments that are already 
accepted in the political sphere by all reasonable citizens. Of course, this is only the 
starting point of the justificatory process, as these commitments still require sys-
tematization — only if a given commitment (e.g., a principle of justice or a solution 
to an AD challenge) is publicly shown to be part of the most plausible system of 
shared moral commitments is it shown to be justified. This presupposes that there 
are certain justified political propositions that form a subset of justified moral propo-
sitions, namely, shared and coherently systematized moral commitments concerning 
issues of justice. Solutions to AD challenges, then, must be justified by showing that 
they belong to this set of justified moral commitments that are shared as such by the 
members of a specific democratic society. In Rawlsian terms: solutions to AD chal-
lenges must be justified within the scope of public reason by showing that they are 
part of the set of considered judgements that form a full reflective equilibrium based 
on an overlapping consensus of a specific liberal society. We contend that this means 
the justification for the solution to AD challenges has been shown to be appealing 
and acceptable to every reasonable citizen.
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To clarify further our proposal, we will relate these findings to the debate on 
political realism and political moralism. The starting point of this debate was a dis-
tinction made by Bernard Williams in his (posthumously published) book In the 
Beginning Was the Deed (Williams, 2005). Political moralism, according to the 
understanding of Williams and most participants of the debate, means that moral-
ity is prior to politics in the sense that it either sets the limits of legitimate political 
authority or sees politics as purely instrumental what makes the quest for political 
legitimacy in both cases a chapter of applied morality or ethics (Williams, 2005, 2). 
Political realists, like Williams, claim that this is not adequate in light of the norma-
tive autonomy and independence of the political sphere as well as in light of the fact 
of reasonable pluralism. Political philosophy (or theory) is thus not seen as depend-
ent on morality abstracting from political reality but essentially involving critical 
reflection of political history, culture, and practice. Participants who see their posi-
tions attacked by these claims (but do normally not use the term “political moralist” 
as self-designation) object that either political realism cannot distinguish properly 
legitimate from illegitimate authority or has to rely on basically moral criteria for 
doing so (e.g., Erman & Möller, 2015, 220–26).
We present the Rawlsian justificatory framework as finding an adequate middle 
ground between political realism and political moralism.6 For readers familiar with 
Williams, this might seem a little odd, since he presents Rawls’s theory as one of the 
two paradigmatic examples for political moralism (the other example is utilitarian-
ism) (Williams, 2005, 1–2). However, according to our interpretation, at least in his 
later works, Rawls should not be seen as a political moralist — Williams does not 
fully acknowledge Rawls’s “political turn” leading to Political Liberalism (Rawls, 
2005; on this topic see also Gledhill, 2012; Jubb, 2015; Thomas, 2017; Rossi, 2019, 
639). Here Rawls does grant the political sphere at least a “basic autonomy” (Erman 
& Möller, 2015, 228–31) from comprehensive moral doctrines: His justificatory 
framework for matters of justice and legitimacy is described as a “freestanding” 
political module consisting of shared commitments within an overlapping consensus 
of actual citizens (Rawls, 2005, 10, 12, 28, 140–41, 154–55). These shared commit-
ments have to be seen as political not metaphysical (Rawls, 1985, 2005, 10, 95–99; 
Rawls, 2001, 14, 181–83), so a simple reduction to moral doctrines that are thought 
to be metaphysically true or correct by some citizens is blocked. Rawls provides a 
historical analysis, which political developments did lead to the prevalence of cor-
responding political commitments (Rawls, 2005, xxi–xxvii). Additionally the reflec-
tion of political reality and culture is a necessary element in trying to achieve a full 
reflective equilibrium, since this requires a holistic view on matters relevant to the 
inquiry (Rawls, 2005, 28; Rawls, 2001, 5–6, 29–32). With regard to the two last 
points, Alan Thomas shares our conclusion that it is inadequate to present Rawls as 
a political moralist:
This is to ignore both Rawls’s explicit commitment to reflective equilibrium and 
his detailed discussion of the nature of political legitimacy in a modern society 
6 We agree with Charles Larmore when he writes: “Political philosophy must be a more complex enter-
prise than either of the customary positions assumes […]” (Larmore 2013, 5).
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developed in Political Liberalism. […] Specifically, it ignores its explanation of why 
Rawls believed that no political conception of justice could be based on any single 
comprehensive conception of the good. Any such conception would fail to acknowl-
edge the particular, practical task of ‘reconciliation’ that political philosophy faces 
in our historically determined situation of reasonable pluralism (Rawls, 2001: 29, 
41). […] Addressing the reflexive precondition of its own possibility is the task of 
political liberalism which, whatever its ultimate plausibility, can hardly be accused 
of being a theory which ignores its historical situatedness. Realists may find Rawls’s 
historical narrative thin and unconvincing, but that is a different criticism from the 
claim that he does not provide one. (Thomas, 2017, 5).
However, we also concede that Rawls should not be seen as political realist: The 
elements of the freestanding political module still have to be seen as a special sort 
of moral commitments and the module has to be integrated by reasonable compre-
hensive doctrines, each of them having their own rationale of doing so (Rawls, 2005, 
11–12, 140–41). It is not morality on its own that sets the limits for legitimate politi-
cal authority; it is moral normativity in combination with political normativity.7 
This is why we claim that a Rawlsian justificatory framework provides an adequate 
middle ground between political moralism and political realism, which are exempli-
fied by the positions of Himmelreich (2018) and Keeling (2020) in the debate on AD 
challenges.
Now, even if it is granted that a middle ground between political realism and 
political moralism is needed and that Rawls’s idea of justification by public rea-
son provides such a middle ground, it does not automatically follow that it has to 
be adopted. There are other approaches, which specify the relation between ethics 
and politics in an alternative way. Rodríguez-Alcázar (2017) is such an alternative 
account which is recently also applied to AD challenges (Rodríguez-Alcázar et al., 
2020).8 It will therefore be necessary to adduce additional arguments for preferring 
the public reason approach. Of course, it is not possible to give a comprehensive jus-
tification of the public reason approach in this paper, and we do not claim to intro-
duce new arguments for it. Rather, we will briefly outline — according to our under-
standing — the two most important considerations that speak in favor of the public 
reason approach.
The first is that a political system and political regulations that are justified within 
the scope of public reason receive a reasonable acceptance that secures political 
stability. If citizens accept a political regulation because it coheres well with their 
convictions about justice, there is no need to try to change this regulation and they 
have intrinsic reasons to comply with it. This would be different if the political 
7 Thomas describes this as a form of co-originality (Thomas 2017, 4). And although he ascribes this 
idea to Williams’s position as an instance of a concessive form of political realism, this concessive polit-
ical realism seems very close to Rawls and to our notion of a middle ground between both idealized 
camps (Thomas 2017, 15 n5, 18 n22).
8 We think the approach proposed by Rodríguez-Alcázar might share with non-concessive forms of 
political realism the inability to discriminate properly between legitimate and illegitimate political 
authority, but a due discussion of this position is beyond the scope of this paper and must be provided in 
the future.
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regulations were not based on an overlapping consensus but on some kind of com-
promise between different political powers. According to Rawls, such a compromise 
would be merely a type of modus vivendi that would be abandoned should the bal-
ance of political powers change (Rawls, 2005, 147; Rawls, 2001, 192, 194f.). Thus, 
political regulation for which no justification can be given that satisfies the con-
ditions of a justification within public reason tends to be instable. But stability is 
needed in cases where the basic structure of society or elements of it are at stake: 
this is the case when an interpretation of fundamental rights is needed and priority 
rules must be determined in cases of conflicts between fundamental rights, such as 
the right to bodily integrity and the right to the freedom of movement and mobility. 
We hold that since regulation for AD touches upon the interpretation of fundamental 
rights and must refer to some kind of priority rules, the justification for that regula-
tion should be stable. This is important not only from a political perspective but also 
from the point of view of engineers and entrepreneurs, who have to work in compli-
ance with those regulations.
The second consideration is that only a public reason approach takes seriously 
the political autonomy of all reasonable citizens. Anyone might agree, irrespective 
of the comprehensive moral doctrine they support, that it is of great value — inher-
ently or instrumentally — for citizens as moral persons to be able to use their own 
reasoning capability to determine the fundamental principles of justice and corre-
sponding interpretations of them (including political regulations that touch upon 
these fundamental principles). Only when persons can see the political principles 
and regulations of their society in a certain sense as the principles and regulations 
that they would implement themselves, were they to reflect upon their beliefs, are 
they in a political sense autonomous. The public reason approach ensures that this is 
the case by requiring that one must appeal to beliefs every reasonable citizen shares 
and propose the most plausible systematization of those shared beliefs relevant to a 
given topic in order to justify a principle of justice or important political regulation. 
If there is in fact an agreement in liberal societies that in an important political sense 
being free means being politically autonomous and that human dignity demands this 
kind of freedom (without presupposing a specific metaphysical explanation of why 
this is the case), this would make a strong rationale for the public reason approach.
Now, these two arguments certainly might not convince someone who has given 
serious thought to the matter and supports a different approach to political legiti-
macy. But the above discussion at least should make clear that the public reason 
approach — which is by no means a niche position — deserves due attention in the 
debate on AD challenges. If one can agree with this modest claim, our further find-
ings are relevant.
3  Details of the Rawlsian Justificatory Framework for Public Reason
In this section, we offer a more concrete account of the justificatory framework asso-
ciated with the public reason approach. Although we will use explicitly Rawlsian 
terminology, we hold that this framework is at least in the most relevant respects 
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compatible with and useful in the context of other variations of the public reason 
approach, such as a Habermasian approach to deliberative democracy.
In the following, we will not focus on Rawls’s original position and its potential 
to inform solutions for AD challenges, for two reasons.9 First, we do not think that 
one is obliged to adopt Rawls’s original position in order to justify claims within the 
scope of public reason. Second, it is an open empirical question whether the original 
position is shared in the overlapping consensus of a specific liberal society. Only if 
this is the case can one reasonably adopt it in order to support solutions to AD chal-
lenges (or any other political claim).
As mentioned above, we instead focus on the notion of full reflective equilib-
rium as the general method for justification within public reason (Rawls, 1995, 141; 
Rawls, 2001, 31f.; Daniels, 1996, 144–75; Daniels, 2020). A full reflective equi-
librium is a special case of a wide reflective equilibrium (Rawls, 1999, 43; Rawls, 
1974; Daniels, 1979, 2020) with the additional condition that the starting and result-
ing commitments are shared within an overlapping consensus. With this method, 
a solution to AD challenges is justified iff it is shown to be part of a full reflective 
equilibrium, i.e., the most plausible systematization of shared political commitments 
concerning the topic. In order to have the potential to achieve a full reflective equi-
librium, certain rules must be followed10:
1) According to the public reason approach, one begins with the commitments that 
are shared by all reasonable doctrines in an overlapping consensus, and so one 
must first determine which of the relevant commitments are actually shared and 
thus part of the overlapping consensus. This is at least in part an empirical task 
and requires a combination of sociological and philosophical research. Since all 
of the elements of a full reflective equilibrium must be shared commitments or at 
least supported by shared commitments, these commitments are the foundation 
of the justification.11
2) One must identify all relevant commitments for the topic at hand and attempt to 
systematize them. Which commitments might be relevant for AD challenges? 
There are likely to be straightforward relevant commitments, e.g., that there is 
a right to mobility, but there might also be commitments that arise only if we 
employ (thought) experiments or through the systematization itself, e.g., that kill-
ing is different than letting someone die. If the commitments are systematized and 
thus seen as connected, conflicts between commitments can arise, e.g., between 
9 If the original position were employed for this topic, it would have to be modified according to the 
four-stage sequence at stage 2 or 3 (Rawls 1999, 171–76; 2001, 48, 173f.). For the claim that one should 
indeed use the original position, see Leben (2017; 2019).
10 This characterization of the method of full reflective equilibrium is compatible with the characteriza-
tion given by Daniels (1996, 144–75; for his characterization of the method in general terms, see 1979; 
2020). See also Schmidt (forthcoming).
11 One could call this the weak foundationalist requirement, since these commitments are not necessar-
ily basic beliefs that one could claim are reliably connected with the truth of the propositions (this would 
already constitute a moderate foundationalism; for this epistemological terminology, see BonJour 1985; 
Elgin 2005).
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the right to mobility and the commitment that no one has the right to impose a 
serious health risk on another. There are various possibilities for adjusting these 
conflicting commitments on all levels of generality in order to bring them into 
agreement with each other: the different possible adjustments lead to different 
possible systems of commitments — all of these systems are candidates for a full 
reflective equilibrium. If there are mutually exclusive solutions for AD challenges, 
they will be part of different candidate systems. Because all relevant commitments 
have to be systematized (so far as this is possible given restrictions of time and 
resources) and because candidate systems of commitments as a whole (and not 
isolated commitments) are evaluated, this could be called the (moderate) holistic 
requirement. In Rawlsian terms: one must always find a wide reflective equilib-
rium, not a narrow one (Rawls, 1999, 43; Rawls, 1974; Daniels, 1979, 2020).
3) In the process of adjustment, no commitment is immune to revision, which results 
in the emergence of many quite different candidate systems for a full reflective 
equilibrium. This requirement is connected to the notion of fallibilism and is a 
crucial element of the method of reflective equilibrium in general.
4) From the various candidate systems, we should choose the one that is — in light 
of all relevant commitments and their inferential connections — the most plausi-
ble. This could be called the minimalistic rationality requirement, since it would 
be irrational to adopt a system of commitments that seems to be less plausible 
than other systems. A solution to AD challenges would be justified if it is shown 
that it is part of this most plausible candidate system of commitments and thus 
of a full reflective equilibrium. Once achieved, a full reflective equilibrium is not 
static and settled for all time, but always open to new considerations — further 
reflection or experiences might lead to new commitments and a new evaluation 
of the emerging possible candidate systems.
The use of the method of full reflective equilibrium to justify solutions to AD 
challenges (or any other concrete political problem) might differ somewhat from the 
justification of principles of justice in Rawls’s A Theory of Justice or Political Lib-
eralism. Instead of relating judgements about justice to abstract principles of justice, 
a justification of a concrete political problem in an actual liberal democracy relates 
concrete political judgements to interpretations of constitutional essentials, human 
rights, fundamental rights, or civil rights.12
One difficulty in achieving not just a wide reflective equilibrium (a system of 
commitments that are justified for a specific person) but a full reflective equilibrium 
(a system of commitments that are justified for all reasonable citizens of a liberal 
democracy) might be the possibility of being mistaken about the content of the over-
lapping consensus (especially since this consensus itself is also dynamic, not static). 
One could additionally be mistaken about differences in the weight that reasonable 
12 Of course, these are included in Rawls’s principles of justice and a more abstract reflection that 
includes principles of justice might be necessary to solve persisting disagreements on lower levels of 
abstraction.
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citizens assign to each commitment even if they share it, and consequently about 
which adjustments seem most plausible. At this point, again, empirically informed 
research is required.13
4  Taking a Closer Look at Some AD Challenges: Principles 
for the Decision‑making Process
In this section, we take a closer look at some AD challenges. AD challenges involve 
a wide range of issues, from data privacy and security14 to moral and legal respon-
sibility for harm caused by AVs,15 regulation of import and export of AD technol-
ogy,16 questions of sustainability,17 and fair access to AD,18 as well as other long-
term effects of AD on various parts of society.19 Technically, all solutions to these 
normative questions should be justified through the method of full reflective equi-
librium insofar as they have consequences for human or fundamental rights. For the 
present paper, we set these issues aside and instead relate our findings specifically 
to one question that is currently a central focus of the debate: how should liberal 
democracies choose and subsequently implement principles to govern the automated 
decision-making process of an AV?
Following a distinction made by Himmelreich (2018), this question can be broken 
down into two interrelated challenges that require solutions justified within a full 
reflective equilibrium if AD is to be implemented in the transport system of a liberal 
democracy:
1) Which principles should guide decisions in real-world trolley cases?
2) Which principles should guide decisions about risk distribution in so-called mun-
dane driving situations?
In the following subsections, we first explore the controversial question whether 
real-world trolley cases are possible, as well as the associated moral challenges and 
13 We stressed already that we restrict our discussion to liberal democracies: One reason is, that accord-
ing to our proposed justificatory framework it would matter which political regime is in power because 
this has strong influence on the political culture and therefore on the political commitments of the citi-
zens and their ability to share their political convictions freely. The latter is a prerequisite for the use of 
the method of full reflective equilibrium (citizens in illiberal societies, of course, still can make personal 
or semi-public use of the critical potential of the method of wide reflective equilibrium, but the public 
discursive forum that could give space to a full reflective equilibrium is restricted).
14 See Hillerbrand, Milchram, and Schippl (2019); Pype et al. (2017); Chaturvedi (2020); Rannenberg 
(2016); and Dhar (2016).
15 See Hevelke and Nida-Rümelin (2015) and Baumann et al. (2019).
16 This is a less discussed topic up until now but might be especially complicated with regard to differ-
ent interpretations of human or basic rights in the international sphere, which might lead to incompatible 
regulatory requirements for AD.
17 See Schreurs and Steuwer (2016) and Brimont, Saujot, and Sartor (2017).
18 See Faber and Lierop (2020).
19 For a general overview, see Grunwald (2016).
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their relevancy to a full reflective equilibrium with respect to AD. In a second step, 
we take a closer look at the decisions arising from mundane driving situations: what, 
if any, moral challenges occur in these cases and (how) do they differ from those 
associated with real-world trolley cases?
4.1  Trolley Cases and Real‑world Trolley Cases
Trolley cases are part of a popular philosophical thought experiment commonly 
known as the trolley problem,20 which has become a familiar staple within the 
debate on AD. In one of its more classical forms, it consists of two very similar 
cases of moral dilemmas that evoke contrary moral intuitions concerning the right 
course of action: In one case, a runaway trolley is heading towards five people on 
the tracks who will be killed by a collision. By pulling a lever, you could redirect 
the trolley onto a different track where one person is present, thereby saving the five 
but killing the one. This trolley case is compared to another, similar trolley case: A 
runaway trolley is on a collision course with five people on the tracks. You could 
push a fat man from a bridge onto the tracks to stop the trolley, thereby saving the 
five but killing the fat man. Although the two cases seem analogous in their outcome 
in terms of the number of lives saved (saving five at the expense of one), they evoke 
contrary moral intuitions about what the right course of action is: in the former case, 
pulling the lever to save the five seems to many people to be at least morally permis-
sible, if not a moral obligation, while in the latter case, pushing the man onto the 
tracks seems to most people to be morally prohibited (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976). 
The function of trolley cases like those described above is to pinpoint exactly the 
morally relevant differences of these seemingly analogous situations, e.g., by shed-
ding light on the difference between “positive” and “negative” duties, between kill-
ing and letting die, or between consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches 
to morality (Keeling, 2020; Nyholm & Smids, 2016).
While the “fat man” trolley case is firmly rooted in the fictional realm of 
thought experiments, the same cannot so readily be said about the original trol-
ley case: prima facie, it seems entirely possible that situations analogous to the 
original trolley case could arise for an AV in the real world (Lin, 2016; Wallach 
& Allen, 2008; Bonnefon et al., 2016). Such real-world trolley cases could take 
the form of the following scenarios: An AV could be faced with the decision to 
stay its course and hit a pedestrian suddenly stepping on the street, thereby killing 
her, or swerving and hitting a wall, thereby killing its passenger. In another vari-
ant, an AV would have to choose between staying the course, hitting and thereby 
risking killing a group of pedestrians, or swerving and thereby sacrificing its sin-
gle passenger. Indeed, there are almost endless variations of such cases. If these 
cases are possible and if they are sufficiently similar to trolley cases, the differ-
ences illuminated by trolley cases as philosophical thought experiments would be 
relevant to this AD challenge as well. However, an increasing number of scholars 
20 On the distinction between trolley cases and trolley problems, see Himmelreich (2018).
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question whether it is possible for trolley-case-like scenarios to occur in the real 
world and are speaking out against centering the normative debate about AD on 
such cases. In general, arguments against the premise of real-world trolley cases 
can be divided into (1) technology-based arguments for the impossibility of trol-
ley cases or sufficiently similar collision scenarios occurring in real life, and (2) 
arguments focused on showing fundamental disanalogies between real-world col-
lision scenarios and trolley cases, which would render the discussion of the latter 
irrelevant to the discussion of AD.
Himmelreich offers an argument of the first type. He states that the assumptions 
necessary to formulate trolley cases seem to be inconsistent with the technological 
possibilities of AD. These two features or assumptions of trolley cases are (1) a col-
lision is “imminent and unavoidable” and (2) “a meaningful choice is nevertheless 
possible” (Himmelreich, 2018, 673). He claims that, from an engineering perspec-
tive, these two features are difficult to reconcile: If a meaningful choice between two 
actions is possible, the collision itself might also either still be avoidable or present 
a different type of choice from that in a trolley case, e.g., between killing a person 
and merely injuring another. On the other hand, if a collision is in fact unavoidable, 
it is unclear whether an AV would still be able to make a meaningful choice between 
two actions. Based on a variation of the idea that “ought implies can” applied to an 
autonomous machine, this line of thinking contends that the two conditions neces-
sary to constitute a trolley case or a sufficiently similar collision scenario cannot 
both be true at the same time for an AV. Himmelreich himself is very cautious about 
the soundness of this argument and about drawing any definite conclusions about 
the (im)possibility of real-world trolley cases (Himmelreich, 2018, 673f.). How-
ever, even if one grants this impossibility for the sake of argument, as does Keeling 
(2018), and accepts that an AV would never encounter a real-world trolley case, it 
does not necessarily follow that philosophical reflection on trolley cases is irrele-
vant to what Keeling calls the “moral design problem” of AD (Keeling, 2020, 293). 
While it might be true that trolley-case-like collision scenarios will not happen in 
real life, trolley cases as philosophical thought experiments try to isolate and illumi-
nate morally relevant properties that are still present in problems of risk distribution 
in mundane driving situations, such as the difference between positive and negative 
duties. Additionally, the idealized thought experiments, understood as moral dilem-
mas, highlight and thereby exemplify the problem of reasonable pluralism, which 
must be dealt with if liberal democracies are to find acceptable solutions to AD 
challenges. Relying on comprehensive doctrines like utilitarianism or Kantianism 
to inform the automated decision-making process of an AV can — prima facie and 
in specific cases — lead to incompatible solutions to such dilemmas. The challenge 
that then arises is identifying political beliefs that these doctrines might (perhaps for 
different reasons) nevertheless share in an overlapping consensus and thus establish-
ing the basis for solutions to real AD challenges that are acceptable to every reason-
able citizen. Therefore, an empirically informed philosophical reflection on idealized 
trolley cases is still useful in the attempt to achieve a full reflective equilibrium, even 
though idealized trolley cases do not themselves present an AD challenge. Even so, 
we would like to stress that the question whether the “impossibility argument” is 
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sound and sufficiently similar real-world trolley cases do not exist is empirical — it 
can only be answered based on relevant results from engineering research.
Presenting the second type of argument, Nyholm and Smids (2016) assert that 
there is a categorical difference between the moral concerns of trolley cases and the 
moral concerns of real-world collision scenarios: the latter take place under condi-
tions of risk or uncertainty that are not present in trolley cases. In contrast to trolley 
cases, real-world collision scenarios involving AVs will always include a substantial 
element of risk and uncertainty, since they are impacted by complex factors such as 
environmental conditions (e.g., weather, the state of the road) and the behavior of 
other road users or bystanders. The decisions AVs have to make are thus not a mat-
ter of certainly killing one person or another, or one person or a group of people. 
Instead, there will be cases where steering towards one affected party will carry, 
for example, a 99% risk of killing (or severely injuring) this party, while staying the 
course will carry 99% risk of killing (or severely injuring) another affected party. 
Because of this different type of reasoning, it is — according to Nyholm and Smids 
— unclear whether any conclusions that can be drawn from the philosophical dis-
cussion about trolley cases are reasonably applicable to the case of AD.21 Neverthe-
less, we would agree with Keeling that, despite this difference, the moral considera-
tions that trolley cases showcase, such as a relevant distinction between killing and 
letting die, might still be an important moral aspect of real-world collision scenar-
ios even with the added dimension of risk and uncertainty. Which moral principles 
should determine a machine’s decision about which risky action to take? Should an 
AV risk killing a person or a group of people by swerving into the other lane, or risk 
letting a person or a group of persons die by staying the course?
To summarize: Including discussion of trolley cases in the debate on AD might 
still be a useful approach, even though real-world collision scenarios occur under 
risk or uncertainty, because the moral considerations they illuminate can tell us 
something about what type of outcome automated decision-making ought to favor 
and why. Furthermore, as long as AD-collision scenarios with very high risks of 
harm as the outcome for each possible decision are technically possible, they seem 
sufficiently similar to trolley cases insofar as these real-world scenarios pose a (dra-
matic) moral challenge or dilemma, where — at least prima facie — some of the 
same moral distinctions are highlighted. We would grant that when the additional 
dimension of risk or uncertainty is taken into account, it is possible that we also 
have to accept new moral distinctions or principles in an ethics of risk or political 
philosophy of risk (Hansson, 2013).22
22 The difference between the ethics of risk and the political philosophy of risk is, according to our posi-
tion, that we seek a personal wide reflective equilibrium for the former and an interpersonal full reflec-
tive equilibrium for the latter.
21 Davnall (2020) takes this third argument as a basis for her claim that the best course of action for any 
AV will be to engage in emergency braking over any kind of swerving action and that AVs will not face 
trolley like cases as such.
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4.2  Risk Distributions in Mundane Driving Situations
Apart from extreme situations like real-world trolley cases, AVs will have to make a 
multitude of mundane decisions during even a short drive. These “mundane driving sit-
uations” include among other things “approaching a crosswalk with limited visibility, 
making a left turn with oncoming traffic, and navigating through busy intersections” 
(Himmelreich, 2018, 678). In any type of driving situation, an AV will have to con-
tinuously update and alter its behavior according to numerous different and constantly 
changing parameters (surrounding objects, other road users, environmental conditions) 
and this turns out to be a very challenging task for an AV: mundane driving situations 
iterated over time can lead to injuries and deaths. In this way, such situations are not 
all that different from trolley cases or real-world collision scenarios. The only differ-
ence lies in the degree of risk and uncertainty: death or harm to at least one party is 
unavoidable in trolley cases, and almost unavoidable in real-world collision scenarios, 
while most mundane driving situations have a significantly lower risk of harm. Despite 
this difference, mundane driving situations are rendered ethically challenging in part 
precisely because of their structural similarity to trolley cases and real-world collision 
scenarios: just like these, mundane driving situations will involve decisions about risk 
distribution between AV users and other road users. Mundane decisions about risk dis-
tribution likewise contain implicit moral judgements (Leben, 2019, 100; Himmelreich, 
2018). For example, it is a moral judgement that one should alter the route of an AV in 
order to lower the risk of a potential collision with a bicyclist and thereby increase the 
AV’s risk of colliding with an object.
In order to develop a sound regulation of AD that is justifiable to all reasonable citi-
zens, it is not only necessary to define the relevant risks and find a way to measure and 
balance them. It is also necessary to explicitly identify the (implicit) intuitions, argu-
ments, and principles that underlie the moral deliberation of risk distribution in such 
mundane driving situations. Only then can they enter into a full reflective equilibrium 
and be part of an overlapping consensus. In the case of the above example, there could 
be several moral reasons for altering the behavior of an AV in favor of the bicyclist. For 
example, one reason could be summed up as a principle of reducing harm: the bicyclist 
is more vulnerable than the AV user and would likely sustain more serious injuries in 
case of a collision. Another reason could be an idea of fairness: since it is the AV user 
that increases the risk of severe injuries by driving a car with a high speed and mass, it 
would be unfair to burden primarily the bicyclist with this increased risk (see Baumann 
et al. 2019). These reasons would have to be balanced with other moral and non-moral 
considerations like an assumed moral difference between killing and letting die (as illu-
minated by the trolley problem), a precautionary principle or the need for an efficient 
mobility system, which can be at odds with optimizing AV for safety (Himmelreich, 
2018, 680).
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5  Substantial and Insubstantial Overlapping Consensus
In finding solutions to AD challenges, one has to rely on the overlapping consensus. 
By outlining the ethical challenges and the underlying values that seem to govern 
intuitive reactions, as shown in the section above, a liberal democracy may ascertain 
some potential candidates for the shared beliefs, values, or principles that are part 
of its overlapping consensus. But this is merely a first and tentative step. How this 
overlapping consensus is structured is an empirical question that requires further 
and thorough investigation from multiple perspectives. Some insight stems from 
the philosophical debate about trolley cases that uncover conflicts between widely 
shared intuitions. Other insights can include findings from other fields of philoso-
phy, from sociology, or from empirical research in general. For example, the moral 
machine experiment by MIT, which gained popularity when it was first launched, 
can provide some limited data about parts of this overlapping consensus (Awad 
et al., 2018). In the case of this specific experiment, it is important not to mistake its 
empirical findings about the course of action a majority of the participants choose 
for a sufficient legitimation of a political decision. Instead, these findings have to be 
seen as forms of considered judgements and should be complemented by the attempt 
to find a full reflective equilibrium. Other empirical studies already explicitly aim to 
inform a reflective equilibrium process (Bergmann et al., 2018). These findings must 
be weighed against the background of values that are already agreed on, e.g., those 
that underlie much of the body of law in liberal democracies. Law itself is another 
important source for shared principles that can be applied to AD.23
Depending on how many shared beliefs, values, and principles exist in a given 
society, one might distinguish two different forms of overlapping consensus and 
their respective results regarding AD challenges: substantial and insubstantial over-
lapping consensus.
5.1  Substantial Overlapping Consensus
An overlapping consensus could be called substantial when there are many shared 
political principles (e.g., the duty to not objectify a person, principles of fairness), 
background theories (e.g., that there is a difference between killing and letting die), 
and other shared beliefs (e.g., knowledge about injury and death statistics for differ-
ent forms of mobility). In this case, it is likely that one can also arrive at substantial 
solutions to AD challenges (e.g., that an AV in a real-world trolley case must retain 
its initial direction of movement if the risk for the least advantaged party cannot 
23 An interesting example offers de Sio (2017) who starts with existing traffic laws and proceeds to 
elaborate their underlying normative principles, with a special focus on the “doctrine of necessity” as a 
potential solution to dilemmatic emergency situations/trolley cases faced by AVs (Santoni de Sio 2017). 
As will become clearer in Sect.  5.1, this approach seems to be a promising way of how a substantial 
overlapping consensus concerning an ethical regulation of AD could be established in practice: Here, 
specific traffic laws and their underlying norms constitute an already established form of consensus. 
Applying them to the case of AD is then a good starting point to formulate regulations that have a high 
likelihood of passing the test of a full reflective equilibrium.
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be significantly reduced). There could also be an acceptable justification for precise 
regulations on how AVs ought to behave in real-world collision situations with risk 
and uncertainty as well as in mundane driving situations, so that it is made clear in 
every possible case which risks can be imposed by AVs on their own passengers and 
on fellow road users.
However, it is no simple task to reveal and then work with a substantial overlap-
ping consensus: How can common beliefs, values, and principles that find wide-
spread agreement on a societal level be identified and then brought into an equi-
librium? While the sources outlined above can be of service here, it is important 
to acknowledge that it is not easy to move from Rawls’s ideal-world overlapping 
consensus and the ideal method of full reflective equilibrium to real-world practice. 
Here, concepts explored within the discipline and practice of technology assessment 
(TA), such as the concept of responsible research and innovation (RRI) (Owen et al., 
2012; Schomberg, 2013) or a value-led design approach (van de Poel, 2016; van de 
Poel & Zwart, 2010), could be used as tools for helping to make explicit the values, 
beliefs, and principles that are already shared in the context of AD and informing 
the political process for AD regulations in line with such a substantial overlapping 
consensus. There is also promising research available on how to use the method of 
wide reflective equilibrium in the context of TA practice (Doorn, 2010, 2012; Doorn 
& Taebi, 2018; van de Poel & Zwart, 2010; Taebi, 2017). This use of the method 
to identify a set of justified proposals based on a substantial overlapping consen-
sus would already include relevant stakeholders in the process and could reflectively 
inform and structure the deliberation of a wider political public, thus facilitating the 
achievement of a full reflective equilibrium.
5.2  Insubstantial Overlapping Consensus
On the other hand, an overlapping consensus might be very limited, i.e., there might 
be very few and rather vague shared political principles, background theories, and 
beliefs. In this case, it is less likely that there will be a justification for solutions to 
AD challenges that is appealing to all reasonable citizens. If AD were nonetheless 
to be introduced in the transport system, a stopgap solution to the challenges of the 
automated decision-making process could be to impose on AVs approximately the 
same regulation as on human drivers. In this case (excluding issues of responsibil-
ity), no moral distinctions would be made between the decisions of an AV and those 
of a human driver, despite potential differences in ability — AVs would be allowed 
the same behavior in real-world trolley cases as is permitted for human drivers and 
could impose the same risks on fellow road users as are acceptable for human driv-
ers according to legislation and court decisions. There would be no decisive moral 
solutions to these AD challenges based on a shared justification but rather worka-
rounds based on the insubstantial consensus established in existing law and the dem-
ocratic decision-making process that can enact regulation by majority vote. Addi-
tional regulation would then only be needed to specify an adequate testing procedure 
prior to the authorization of AVs in order to determine that the implementation of 
existing traffic regulations is successful, and to settle questions of accountability 
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for accidents (e.g., clarifying what cases fall under product liability or determining 
compensation for harm when accidents happen within the bounds of existing regula-
tions and in the absence of technical malfunction).
While such a stopgap measure might be seen as a good compromise in the 
absence of a substantial overlapping consensus, it also seems to be somewhat 
problematic and unsatisfying. It is problematic for practical reasons: While the 
stopgap measure is a commonly proposed solution to AD challenges, it neglects 
the complex nature of traffic regulations for humans and the social interaction 
with which these regulations are balanced. It is unclear how well existing legal 
regulations for human drivers can be translated into an algorithmic form in order 
to be implementable in an autonomous system. In other words, the stopgap solu-
tion is especially vulnerable to the “challenge of specificity” (Himmelreich, 
2018). This becomes apparent in regulations relating to certain abilities that a 
human can cultivate but a machine lacks or merely imitates (e.g., “anticipatory 
driving”) and whose specifics are notoriously difficult to pinpoint and translate. 
While this problem is not isolated to the stopgap, it is exacerbated here by the 
fact that legal traffic regulations are full of this kind of difficult-to-define termi-
nology. In addition, the stopgap solution seems to be somewhat unsatisfying for 
normative reasons: AD offers an opportunity to secure a safer transport system 
within which certain social and ethical values consistently inform decisions made 
in traffic. The benefit of automated decision-making in AD over human decision-
making lies in its speed of action, its incorruptibility and its overall consistency 
in applying whatever rules have been implemented in it. For the stopgap solution, 
this means that in the best case, AD will follow traffic regulations more consist-
ently than human drivers and thereby contribute to safer traffic overall. But why 
should we stop there, when we could instead implement better rules for decision-
making in an AV — rules that a human cannot follow but a sophisticated machine 
can? Compared to the possibilities offered by a substantial overlapping consensus 
that identifies specific social and moral values for decision-making, an insubstan-
tial overlapping consensus and its proposed stopgap solution appear as a squan-
dered opportunity.
6  A Veto Against AD?
A further question is whether it is desirable for a given society to implement AD in 
its transport system at all. This question must also be answered within an overlap-
ping consensus. A decisive answer pro or contra AD implementation most likely 
depends on the quality of the overlapping consensus itself and the solutions to var-
ious AD challenges. In our view, both an insubstantial and a substantial overlap-
ping consensus could lead to a veto of AD implementation for a number of different 
reasons.
We see three ways an insubstantial overlapping consensus might lead, not to a 
stopgap solution, but to an outright prohibition of AD:
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First, there could be a significant disagreement about the stopgap measure itself. 
If according to the stopgap an AV could be licensed upon proving that it drives at 
least as safely as a normal (or good) human driver, then it is necessary to articu-
late precisely what the political standard entails that specifies who counts as an ade-
quately responsible human driver. If there were no minimal agreement on such a 
standard or its respective tests for AVs, then it would be impossible to license AVs.
Second, in an insubstantial overlapping consensus, there may be disagreement or 
uncertainty about whether AD is morally permissible or not. For precautionary rea-
sons, it might then be impermissible to license AVs.
And third, an insubstantial overlapping consensus could also be the result of a 
fundamental and unresolvable disagreement concerning the values that should be 
implemented in an AV. With respect to the fact of reasonable pluralism, different 
reasonable moral doctrines could arrive at different and incommensurable answers 
to the questions raised by AD. This worry seems to be inherent in the broad media 
attention given to trolley cases in reporting on AD, because it focuses exactly on 
this point: there seem to be different and perhaps even incommensurable solutions 
to dilemma situations, each justified by a specific comprehensive doctrine and with-
out the prospect of ultimately proving what the true or correct moral solution is. 
However, some shared solution is necessary if AD is to be implemented, because 
AD must be accessible to every reasonable citizen. To demonstrate this point, imag-
ine the following somewhat eccentric scenario: Under the assumption that utilitar-
ians and Kantians would come to different conclusions regarding AD challenges, if 
AVs were simply implemented with utilitarian values, a Kantian might not be able 
to use such AVs. As the technology became more embedded in society, this would 
ever more severely affect their life. If they could de facto no longer participate in 
the transportation system, this is, prima facie, something that cannot be justified to 
them. The fear is that with an insubstantial overlapping consensus, reasonable plu-
ralism might lead to an impasse in the case of AD, rendering an adequate regulation 
and a subsequent legitimate implementation of the technology impossible.
Yet even if there is a substantial overlapping consensus, it could be the case that 
AD should not be implemented if (1) there are shared values that prohibit AD or (2) 
it is technologically impossible to implement shared values in an AV.
In the first case, there may be a substantial overlapping consensus in the sense 
that certain values are agreed upon, such as a shared belief that people have an 
absolute (political) duty not to objectify persons. This could be a belief that is jus-
tifiable to all citizens based on their finding reasons for adhering to this principle 
within their own comprehensive doctrines.24 If it then turns out that it is impossible 
to implement AD without violating the (political) duty of not objectifying persons, 
e.g., because the shared understanding is that automated decisions about risk-distri-
bution always take the form of killing and never of letting die, there would in turn be 
an absolute duty not to implement AD.
24 The reasoning behind rule-utilitarianism is an example of this: a utilitarian could agree to such a prin-
ciple on a political level, because they believe that including it in a specific political system will maxi-
mize the utility overall, even if it lowers utility in individual cases.
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The second case refers to an argument presented by Himmelreich (2018, 675; 
see also Keeling, 2020, 301): Imagine there is a shared agreement about the val-
ues that should inform the rules and criteria for decision-making to be implemented 
in AVs. To ensure that AVs actually adhere to these values, they would have to be 
implemented using a top-down approach where specific rules for decision-mak-
ing are implemented in an AV by the programmer. In actual engineering practice, 
however, automated decision-making is implemented with a bottom-up approach 
where methods of machine learning are used. While this approach is very effec-
tive, the drawback for the political and moral issues of AD is that it is opaque: it 
often remains unclear and nearly impossible to trace in retrospect what inferences 
machine learning algorithms draw from the available data and subsequently what 
kind of “reasons,” rules or criteria they apply in their decision-making processes. 
So even if there is a shared agreement on the values that should inform the rules of 
the decision-making process of an AV, it is not certain that machine-learning algo-
rithms would infer these rules from the training data. But if it is not feasible with a 
top-down approach and technically impossible with a bottom-up approach to ensure 
that the decisions of an AV truly express a society’s shared values, then one possible 
conclusion could be to prohibit AD.
In view of the history of technological progress, it seems unlikely that a society 
could significantly hinder the development of technology towards increasing auto-
mation even in the face of such fundamental ethical challenges.25 On the political 
stage of a non-ideal world, the purported benefits of AD could outweigh these con-
cerns, even if a prohibition would be the conclusion of a substantial overlapping 
consensus. Because of this, even with a justified veto against AD, it might be sensi-
ble to at least try to shape the budding technology as much as possible in conformity 
with the shared values of society. In any case, we do not seek to propose an elabo-
rate solution to the issue of authorization of AD, but simply wish to point out that it 
is not adequately addressed in the current debate.
7  Conclusion
We have shown that the problem of reasonable pluralism is important for the 
debate on AD challenges and that against this background a Rawlsian justificatory 
framework deserves due attention. According to this framework, solutions to AD 
challenges have to be identified within public reason by forming a full reflective 
equilibrium. We elaborated on this by taking a closer look at two exemplary AD 
challenges, which are central in the current debate: real-world trolley cases and rules 
for risk distribution. With respect to these challenges, a substantial overlapping con-
sensus might lead to a specific regulation for AD while an insubstantial overlapping 
25 See also JafariNaimi (2018) who cautions against a sense of inevitability where AD is concerned and 
instead urges us to “restore the deep sense of uncertainty accompanied with this technology” (Jafari-
Naimi 2018, 14) and to rethink mobility in general in order to increase safety especially for vulnerable 
groups.
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consensus might result in a stopgap solution that imposes (approximately) the same 
regulation on AD as on human drivers. A further but related question that needs 
more attention is the issue of whether it is desirable to authorize AD at all.
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